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Why the United States is more 
religious but less Christian than 
Europe
Adrian Pabst
The transatlantic debate on secularisation has crystallised a series of disagree-
ments that in reality mask a shared perspective.1 As José Casanova has suggested, 
European theories that link secularisation to modernisation capture much of 
Europe’s evolution but they do not fit the facts of religious vibrancy and denomi-
national pluralism that are emphasised by American accounts, which in turn 
cannot explain significant variations across Europe.2 This impasse has reinforced 
rival ideas of exceptionalism, either in relation to US religiosity or in respect of 
‘Eurosecularity’ (or indeed both at once).3 However, these competing interpreta-
tions share the fundamental view that the USA and Europe constitute opposing 
ends of a broad spectrum of different ‘political-religious’ models. The United 
States is associated with the enduring – and many argue excessive – influence 
of faith in politics. By contrast, most of Europe is equated with the demise of 
organised religion and the advance of what Rowan Williams has termed ‘pro-
grammatic secularism’ in the public political sphere.4 Given this, the European 
experience appears to illustrate certain versions of the ‘secularisation’ thesis 
whereas the American experience seems to exemplify certain variants of the ‘de-
secularisation’ thesis. Common to both theses is an essentialist view of religion 
that reflects a shared secular perspective underpinning the sociological analysis 
of religion in politics.5
This chapter argues that the standard theories of secularisation and de-secu-
larisation cannot explain the representation of faith in the European or the US 
political system. In fact, the current phase of late (or post-)modernity is synony-
mous neither with increasingly secularised societies6 nor with a sustained return 
to religion7 but in fact both at the same time. What we are seeing is an increasing 
contest – within as well as across different religious traditions – between tradi-
tional, orthodox faiths and modernising creeds. It is this contest that will largely 
determine the shape of the emerging ‘post-secular’ age.
The first section suggests that the sociological analysis of religion lacks certain 
theological concepts that are necessary for a proper account of the links between 
politics and faith. The second section links Protestant secularisation to North 
American religiosity and argues that much of mainstream US Protestantism rep-
resents a post-Christian Gnostic spirituality that perpetuates the myth of American 
exceptionalism. The third section concedes that Europe is the most secularised 
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continent but contends that it remains a vestigially Christian polity. What emerges 
from this analysis is a paradox: just as the United States is more religious than 
Europe, so too the ‘old continent’ is more Christian than the ‘new world’.
(De-)secularisation in question
Faith beyond the categories of religious studies and the sociology of 
religion
The dominant models of secularisation and de-secularisation analyse the historical 
and social evolution of religion in the modern era from an essentially secular per-
spective that is founded upon certain sociological, anthropological, philosophical 
and (mostly hidden) theological claims which are conceptually and empirically 
problematic.
In religious studies and the sociology of religion, the paradigm of secularisa-
tion and de-secularisation is closely connected with the concept of modernisation 
and other characteristically modern concepts such as disenchantment, ration-
alisation, bureaucratisation, industrialisation, individualisation, privatisation and 
liberalisation. What underpins these and cognate categories is an ahistorical and 
positivist notion of ‘social system’ that precedes and grounds living communities 
and the body politic. Indeed, the premise of much sociological analysis is that 
social systems are sets of general social facts and laws which are prior to – and 
more fundamental than – actual societies. Based on the idea of social systems, 
sociologists of religion as diverse as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber (as well 
as their present-day heirs) view the growing crisis of religious consciousness as 
a conclusive proof for the progressive secularisation of modern life.8 Likewise, 
Peter Berger and other sociologists who defend the seemingly opposite thesis of 
de-secularisation point to the persistence of religious consciousness in individuals 
and groups as strong evidence that modernisation is compatible with the enduring 
presence of faith traditions.9 Linked to this is a second foundational premise of 
religious studies and the sociology of religion: that faith itself is primarily about 
individual belief and the inner self rather than communal practice (both liturgical 
and social) or associative ties.
As such, both the secularisation and the de-secularisation thesis are grounded 
in a peculiar conception that views the social as a product of human artifice over 
against the externally given reality of unalterable nature. This contrasts sharply 
with ancient and medieval ideas of society as having organic links with all its con-
stituent members and with the divinely created universe as a whole. Connected to 
the human construction of the social is a predominantly instrumental account of 
religion that sees faith as satisfying some primordial emotional or spiritual need 
rather than responding to the natural desire for the supernatural. Moreover, recent 
research in anthropology suggests that diverse cultures have tended to view instru-
mental motivations and transactions as embedded in non-instrumental interests 
and relations exemplified by customs of gift-exchange.10 Both social bonds and 
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intermediary institutions have traditionally been more fundamental than either 
formal constitutional-legal rights or formal economic-contractual ties. Thus, what 
constitutes societies and provides the glue for cultures is not some social facticity 
or a set of regularities but instead the formal institutions and informal practices of 
households, groups and communities. Aided by trade and communication, it is the 
cross-border flow of ideas and customs (including religious belief and rituals) that 
most of all links nations to one another and binds the globe together.
Anthropological research also indicates that notions such as general social 
systems and purely individual consciousness do not reflect the reality of most 
cultures around the world. Furthermore, the standard models of both secularisa-
tion and de-secularisation theories defend essentialist conceptions of religious 
faith that disembed religions from their distinct contexts and reduce religion to 
a series of abstract, uniform principles or sentiments. Whether these are either 
inner psychological phenomena linked to human nature (instead of the entire 
cosmos) or outer social phenomena tied to formal institutions and general spir-
itual exercises (instead of specific communities and practices of worship) – or 
indeed both at once – sociological analysis imposes these and other ahistorical 
categories on diverse traditions. Here it is instructive to draw on the work of Talal 
Asad, who argues that seventeenth-century conceptions of religion amounted to 
an invention of a new category of ‘natural religion’, which is closely correlated 
with the rise of natural science independent of any other disciplines. This con-
figuration is itself the product of a split of philosophy and physics from theology, 
as both Amos Funkenstein and Peter Harrison have documented.11 The modern 
focus on ‘inner’ belief at the expense of ‘outer’ revelation views religion in 
terms of ‘a set of propositions to which believers gave assent, and which could 
therefore be judged and compared between different religions and as against 
natural science’.12
Such and similar accounts, which underpin Locke’s idea of the reasonable-
ness of Christianity and Kant’s notion of a single, universal religion, not only 
eliminate the idea of divine self-revelation in the world but also posit a unitary, 
transhistorical essence of faith that can ultimately be reduced to non-religious 
aspects, notably modern notions of immanent nature or consciousness. As such, 
religion is redefined in one of two ways: either as innate, natural religion that 
is in line with rationality or as blind, fideistic belief in the external intervention 
of divine providence. These two apparently incompatible conceptions are in fact 
conceptual mirror images that are opposed to two anthropological findings: first, 
that religions constitute distinct forms of belief and practice irreducible to any 
other sphere (whether nature, human consciousness or social activity); second, 
that religious symbols embody models of and for reality that are inscribed in nar-
ratives, meaning and culture that escape the cognitive control of Cartesian rules 
of the mind or the voluntarism of Kant’s categorical imperative. For narratives, 
meaning and culture cannot be subsumed under any abstract, disembodied con-
cept representing general laws of natural regularity or human consciousness, or 
else again both at once.
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Philosophical theology and the secular redefinition of religion
From the perspective of philosophical theology, the primacy of these and other 
modern general categories over premodern conceptions of the link between uni-
versal principles and particular practices can be traced to a variety of traditions, 
beginning with Roger Bacon, Petrarch, Machiavelli and the influential Jesuit 
thinker Francisco Suárez. The late scholastic separation of supernatural faith 
from the ‘pure nature’ (pura natura) of the material, physical world introduced 
an unbridgeable dualism into Christian theology and paved the way for the early 
modern empiricism of Francis Bacon as well as the rationalism of Descartes and 
Leibniz. Common to these and other modern thinkers is a rejection of classi-
cal theism in favour of either transcendentalism or positivism. The latter is not 
confined to Enlightenment figures such as Voltaire but extends to influential 
nineteenth-century thinkers who shaped the sociology of religion, notably the 
post-theistic social theory of Auguste Comte.13 Crucially, the positivist legacy 
continues to shape much of the contemporary philosophical discourse on religion, 
including the atheism of Bertrand Russell and Richard Dawkins but also the reli-
gious fundamentalism of al-qaeda’s intellectual founding fathers.14
Theologically, the centrality of positivism in the sociology of religion has pro-
voked a robust critique of the secular nature of sociological discourse as well as 
the recognition that the shared origins of modern philosophy and social theory are 
distinctly theological, as John Milbank and Charles Taylor have argued in differ-
ent yet complementary ways.15 Much of modern sociology is secular in the sense 
of positing an autonomous understanding of religion independently from other 
disciplines and on the basis of an undemonstrated dualism between nature and 
the supernatural. Linked to this is a hidden dependency on theological concepts 
which social theory attempts to conceal, most notably the modern idea of society 
as a self-grounded positive datum rather than part of a transcendent cosmic reality 
such as the divine gift of creation.
Similarly, much of modern philosophy either is theological in origin or requires 
theology to make sense of its own claims. Indeed, the idea that philosophy (and 
later natural science) is the only universal discipline concerned with the datum 
of pure nature, and that theology is a merely regional science investigating the 
supernatural ‘realm’ of revelation, is the product of a redefinition of theology 
(compared, say, with St Thomas Aquinas’s theory of the subalternation of all 
disciplines to the science of theology). Even a brief genealogy of this and other 
related changes is beyond the scope of the present chapter. However, the crucial 
point is that the concept of transcendental, univocal being (a single concept of 
being that includes creator and creation) and the idea of representation – which, 
taken together, constitute the ultimate foundations of modern and contemporary 
thought – can be traced to the proto-secular transformation of theology at the 
hands of John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Francisco Suárez, as the 
work of the Swiss philosopher André de Muralt and the French political theorist 
Pierre Manent on the intellectual origins of liberalism attests.16
What links late medieval scholasticism to modern philosophy and to contem-
porary liberalism is the shift of emphasis away from the analogical participation 
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of immanent reality in the transcendent source of being in God towards a dual-
ism whereby, first of all, the sacred is transcendentalised and relegated to the 
supernatural realm of faith and revelation, which are henceforth unintelligible to 
reason. Second, the secular ‘domain’ of society is positivised and equated with 
the purely natural sphere of material reality and human volition. Concomitantly, 
the patristic and medieval idea of real embodied relations between persons and 
groups was abandoned in favour of the nominalist poles of the individual and the 
collective. These and other modern categories underpin the political poles of the 
‘left’ and the ‘right’ that have been dominant since the French Revolution. They 
are also correlated with the subsumption of religious institutions and civil society 
to the central state and the free market.17 Thus, secularisation reconfigures and 
constrains the realm of civil society that mediates between the individual, the state 
and the market18 – a free realm that is ultimately secured by the Judaeo-Christian 
separation of political from religious authority.
This has far-reaching implications for religion in Europe and subsequently in 
North America. Instead of binding believers together in a universal brotherhood, 
faith is increasingly tied either to individuals or to nations (or again to both at 
once), and the secular space of the social is seen as an autonomous, self-standing, 
general facticity that predefines the ground for supernatural revelation and reli-
gious practice. To be sure, the secularisation of thought was not linear, nor did it 
translate directly into the secularisation of practice. However, the modern redefi-
nition of religion along secular lines has had a profound and lasting impact on the 
complex links between faith and politics in the European and American West, as 
the following section suggests.
Protestant secularisation and North American religiosity
On protestant secularisation
Historically, the decisive difference in relation to the secularisation of society 
and politics is between Protestantism and Catholicism, but in ways that go far 
beyond Max Weber’s thesis on the work ethic. The three key Protestant North 
Atlantic powers of England, Holland and independent North America rejected 
the overarching ecclesial and social unity of their Catholic rivals, both in terms of 
their own (philosophically and theologically shaped) self-conception and also as 
a principle of socio-economic and political organisation. As David Martin argues, 
this led to three long waves of secularising modernisation:
beginning in the 1590s, accelerating from 1790 to 1850, and renewing the 
impulse again in the early 1900s. very loosely these stages correspond to a 
movement towards a lay, popular and enthusiastic Christianity, culminating in 
Pentecostal awakenings with a particularly powerful and influential eruption 
in Los Angeles in 1906. These awakenings were themselves harbingers of 
global society and their spread corresponded to the movement of lay people 
around the globe, to South Africa, Norway, Sicily, Korea or the Southern 
Cone of Latin America.19
[14]
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Thus, the origins and evolution of the Protestant Reformation contained the 
seeds of a vast process of secularisation in the sense of displacing Catholic and 
Orthodox Christianity in favour of new lay cultures that initially detached religion 
from statehood, territoriality and nationhood – only to be co-opted by princes and 
kings in the late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ‘wars of religion’ and the sub-
sequent foundation of new liberal-Protestant kingdoms or empires. Much later, 
various strands in the wider Protestant tradition came to form powerful social 
movements that are now attempting to capture state power in countries as varied 
as Guatemala, Brazil and South Korea.20 Here one can suggest a paradox: by 
subordinating the religious freedom of individuals and communities to the central 
state, Protestantism simultaneously secularises religion and sacralises politics.
Coupled with the exceedingly short history of Protestantism sketched above, 
one can also suggest against Marcel Gauchet that secularisation does not mark 
the progressive exit of religion from religion.21 Instead, the secular turn of moder-
nity was the outcome of a series of shifts in theological ideas that led to changes 
within and across religious traditions, frequently boosting the vitality and dynam-
ics of specific faiths. In the case of the West’s main Protestant powers, popular 
religious practice and the political influence of faith grew strongly and at times 
even spectacularly. This is evinced by Holland’s and Britain’s liberal-Protestant 
imperialism, linked to certain strands in Calvinism and the increasing influence 
of Methodism. Indeed, Britain’s rise to hegemonic status within the international 
system was connected with the modernising creed of the Methodists, who insti-
tuted a moral economy that was largely shared by the elite and the populace.22 
Likewise, the Evangelical awakening throughout the ‘long nineteenth century’ 
(c. 1800–1950) coincided with a period of wholesale modernisation, setting the 
USA firmly on the path of global hegemony.23 The following section explores the 
nature and extent of North American exceptionalism compared with the European 
experience.
On North American exceptionalism
North America can be described as much more religious than Europe in terms of 
personal observance and political discourse, linked as it is to competitive plural-
ism and a vibrant religious market. However, the United States is far more secular 
in terms of equating faith with private therapy and with a directed, unmediated 
link between the individual and the Almighty. This underplays other key aspects 
of traditional, orthodox religion such as sacramentality and the communal char-
acter of faith. Indeed, the fact that most American churches have functioned as 
voluntary associations has tied them much more closely to the idea (going back 
to the founding fathers) that the USA is a ‘commercial republic’, blending certain 
civic virtues with economic values as part of a divinely instituted ‘economy’ of 
market competition.24 This also helps explain why in some important sense even 
observant believers tend uncritically to embrace core features of secular culture – 
for instance the idea of a ‘gospel of wealth’ that equates the rich with the elect and 
sanctifies the pursuit of power and pleasure.25
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Moreover, the US ‘civil religion’ is largely governed by a post-Christian, 
Gnostic spirituality that bears increasingly little resemblance to creedal 
Christianity.26 Its liberal polity, based on a total church–state separation since its 
inception,27 is structured by specifically American holidays rather than univer-
sal Christian festivals that still regulate public life, even in the secular French 
Republic. Paradoxically, America’s more strongly privatised public sphere opens 
up a space for a more explicitly politicised and moralised creed that is more 
fundamental than the rivalry between traditionalist-conservative and progressive-
liberal values fuelling the ‘culture wars’. The other paradox is that the country’s 
vague ‘religiosity’, which pervaded US politics, feeds on the Manichean moral-
ism taught in mainstream churches in order to reinforce and perpetuate a sense of 
national exceptionalism,28 rather than a more plural universalism associated with 
Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy or Anglicanism . Indeed, the constant 
appeal since independence to notions such as New Rome or New Jerusalem – 
coupled with the promotion of global market democracy as America’s mission 
for the world – reveals a form of modern messianism which nonetheless has roots 
in medieval millenarianism and is deeply secular.29 All of this helps account for 
the tendency of US Catholics (and Jews) to become more like Protestants, even 
though strong Catholic immigration might change this in future.
There are also signs that the progressive tradition of evangelicals is being 
revived. Indeed, large sections of North American evangelicals have sought to 
transform modern secular politics and economics. Until the First World War 
and again during the Civil Rights movement of the late 1950s and the 1960s, 
they were in fact politically progressive.30 Evangelicalism was anti-elitist, anti-
authoritarian, economically egalitarian (against corporate banking and wealthy 
landlords) and socially interventionist on behalf of the common good: running 
social programmes for the poor, vastly expanding popular institutions such as 
the US postal service and providing some of the earliest critique of laissez-faire 
capitalism. Partly in response to the Democratic Party’s growing secular agenda 
in the late 1960s, both evangelicals and Catholics embraced the New Right and 
formed a coalition with the Republicans,31 endorsing the sort of ‘small govern-
ment’ economic policies first advocated by Ronald Reagan and now defended by 
the Tea Party movement.
At the same time, the United States is currently witnessing a rapprochement 
between certain evangelicals and Catholics that attempts to re-orient the American 
Dream away from right-wing market-driven materialism (or the social-democrat 
alternative of statist welfare) towards greater self-organisation of communities 
and the associative ties of intermediary institutions. Linked to this is the argument 
that civil society is neither synonymous with commercial exchange nor the same 
as purely voluntary action but instead represents a more primary realm that is 
ultimately upheld by the church. This vision is advanced by a new generation 
of influential evangelicals like such as Wallis, Richard Cizik and Rick Warren, 
whose work resonates strongly with Catholic social teaching and cognate tradi-
tions in the Episcopalian Church.32 This, in turn, suggests that Protestant seculari-
sation is neither unilinear nor irreversible but is itself a dialectical process that 
[15]
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oscillates between a dominant secularism, which is positively correlated with 
modernisation, and a more traditional faith, which challenges the secular orienta-
tion of modernity. As the work of José Casanova shows, a number of religious 
movements become significant social and political actors precisely to the extent 
that they renounce the complicit collusion with old structures of power (e.g. 
states/governments, oligarchic elites).33 Here one can go further and suggest that 
such movements establish themselves as genuinely prophetic voices in so far as 
they offer new models of economic modernisation that are neither exclusively 
religious nor purely secular.
However, much of the United States remains wedded to the characteristically 
American ‘civil religion’ that resembles more a vague religiosity than the distinctly 
Christian faith tradition. Based on all these elements, one can arguably reverse 
conventional characterisations and speak of an American exception or rather an 
American exceptionalism that fuses elements of medieval millenarianism with 
modern Puritanism and Calvinism as well as ‘post-modern’ Pentecostalism. By 
contrast, Catholic and Orthodox Europe has largely rejected messianic and apoca-
lyptic visions as incompatible with the shared doctrine of the first 1,000 years 
of the Christian era. Despite the Great Schism and the Protestant Reformation, 
Europe is and remains a profoundly Christian culture and polity, as the following 
section argues.
Catholic–orthodox countermodernity and the endurance of 
‘Christian Europe’
Modernity and counter-modernity
Just as the process of secularisation leads in some dialectical fashion to a resur-
gence of religion, so modernity contains within itself the seeds of countermoder-
nity. Thus, there is no unitary trend whereby Europe becomes either steadily more 
secularised or somehow more de-secularised. Instead, what we are witnessing is 
a coincidence of more secularisation and a sustained return to religion. Europe is 
experiencing an increasing bifurcation – both within and across different faiths – 
of more traditional, orthodox traditions such as Roman Catholicism and Eastern 
Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and more modernising creeds such as certain evan-
gelical and Pentecostal strands, on the other hand. Indeed, more historicised and 
contextualised sociological analysis suggests a number of ‘stylised facts’: first 
of all, the fundamental differences between Protestant countries, where religion 
and modernity have been compatible, and Catholic countries, where they have 
tended to clash; second, the significance of degrees of pluralism and religious 
monopoly, including church establishment in the United Kingdom or disestab-
lishment in certain parts of Scandinavia such as Sweden; third, the fusion of 
religion with ethno-national identities and the rise of denominational plurality, for 
example in countries of post-communist Eastern Europe; fourth, the divergence 
between secularised elites and ordinary believers within and across the growing 
gulf that separates urban centres from rural peripheries, for example in countries 
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with strongly secular constitutions such as France or Turkey; and, fifth, the rise of 
individualism and the privatisation of social life, coupled with the resurgence of 
religion in society and also politics. All of this underscores the difference between 
those religious strands that espouse modernisation and those that reject it.
Moreover, the emergence of a culturally and socially secular Europe in the 
sense of popular religion and mass practices is in fact quite recent. In spite of 
violent clashes between the French state and the Roman Catholic Church from 
the inception of the Protestant Reformation and the Revolution until total separa-
tion in 1905, the population remained predominantly Catholic until the 1950s or 
so, when French Christendom (chrétienté) begins to disappear from the regions 
and the countryside, as vividly depicted in the writings of George Bernanos.34 
Secularisation is similarly recent in the other Mediterranean parts of Europe, 
including the Iberian peninsula and Greece. Even in Britain, arguably one of 
Europe’s most secularised societies today (besides the Czech Republic, Iceland 
and East Germany), the ‘de-christianisation’ of the public sphere and social life 
did not begin in earnest until the mid- and late 1960s.35
Likewise, Scandinavia and other European countries became markedly more 
secular only from the mid-1970s and early 1980s onwards. Even after seventy 
years of state-sponsored atheism and the violent destruction of Christian culture 
in the Soviet Union and its satellites, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia 
are characterised by profound contrasts between a strong and sustained religious 
revival in countries such as Poland and (to a much lesser extent) Russia, and 
a growing tendency towards agnosticism and atheism in countries such as the 
Czech Republic.36 If Europe’s socio-cultural and political secularisation is far 
more recent than commonly supposed, then it seems that its Christian legacy is 
not quite as marginal as is frequently claimed.
On ‘Christian Europe’
Europe is in many ways the most secularised continent in the world,37 but it 
remains a vestigially Christian polity that initially developed from the fusion 
of biblical revelation with Greco-Roman philosophy.38 Following the demise of 
imperial Rome, three forces competed for its legacy and shaped European civili-
sation: first, pagan tribes from Germanic, Turkic and Slavonic territories; second, 
Christianity and its network of local parishes and transnational monasteries; third, 
Islam and the establishment of a caliphate from Arabia to the Iberian peninsula. 
Of those, as Rowan Williams argues:
the Christian Church is quite simply the most extensive and enduring, whether 
in the form of the Western Papacy or of the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’, the 
network of cultural and spiritual connections in Eastern Europe linked to the 
new Roman Empire centred on Constantinople.39
After the fall of Byzantium in 1453, the Protestant Reformation accelerated 
the slow disintegration of pan-European political Christendom and the rise to 
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power of sovereign nation-states. However, this did not inaugurate a linear pro-
cess of secularisation. In fact, certain strands of Renaissance humanism and the 
Enlightenment provided a religious corrective to secular ideas and practices such 
as the early modern doctrine of the ‘divine right of kings’, which itself marked a 
departure from the patristic and medieval opposition to the sacralisation of secular 
power.40 In addition to debates about the relative balance of state and church or 
the mix of different sources of law (canon, common and civil), the presence of 
Jewish communities and Muslim-ruled lands on the Iberian peninsula ensured 
that ‘Christian Europe’ was not a clerically dominated monolith but rather a realm 
of political argument within and across different faith traditions.
Crucially, Europe’s unique legacy of faith and reason provides the basis for 
European claims to an ‘organically’ plural universalism that avoids both moral 
relativism and political absolutism by offering a free, shared social space for 
religious and non-religious practice: the realm of civil society that is more 
primary than either the central state or the free market. Moreover, Hellenised 
Christianity blends the principle of free association in Germanic common law 
with the Latin sense of equity and participation in the civitas. In this manner, 
European Christendom defends a more relational account (in terms of objective 
– not subjective – rights and reciprocal duties) that outflanks the dialectic of the 
individual and the collective that has been dominant since the American and the 
French Revolution. Thus, creedal Christianity does not simply underpin many 
European political and legal systems by distinguishing – without, however, sepa-
rating – religion from politics. It is also instrumental to the integration of believers 
and non-believers by providing a common civic culture and social bonds that 
are more fundamental than either formal constitutional-legal rights or economic-
contractual ties.
However, appeals to Europe’s Christian roots are viewed as either naïve or 
suspicious. The Enlightenment that sought to separate religion from politics is 
widely credited with abolishing the unholy alliance between the church, monar-
chical absolutism and the feudal capitalism of the landed gentry. Moreover, the 
Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox churches are seen as bulwarks of reac-
tionary thinking opposed to liberal democracy and representative government, 
until at least the post-1945 and the post-1989 era respectively. Moreover, ever 
since Jacques Delors served as President of the European Commission (1985–95), 
the European (Economic) Community and later the European Union have been 
described as a Christian club that is determined to exclude non-Christian nations 
such as Turkey. Linked to this is the accusation that Roman Catholic Christians 
within the Union look back to Constantine’s and/or Charlemagne’s alignment of 
the church with the state – a putative challenge to the secular settlement of the 
French Enlightenment championed by Anglo-Saxon and continental European 
thinkers of the left and the right alike.41
However, the European Union is neither a Franco-German federalist superstate 
nor a purely Anglo-Saxon free-trade area. Rather, the Union is best described as 
a neo-medieval polity with a political system sui generis, characterised by hybrid 
institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, polycentric authority and multi-level 
[16]
UNCORRECTED PROOF Date: 10:36 Friday 20 April 2012File: Representing Religion 1P
The shape of post-secularity 179
governance.42 What ultimately underpins this model is a long tradition that 
views Europe not as a foundation in or of itself but as the continuous unfold-
ing of the Hellenistic fusion of Jerusalem with Athens, as Cardinal Angelo Scola 
has remarked.43 In the long Middle Ages, Hellenised Christianity integrated and 
transformed other European traditions such as elements of Germanic law or the 
Celtic language. Linked to this blending of diverse cultures is the twin notion that 
the distinction of religious from political authority creates a ‘free space’ between 
political rule and society, as I have already hinted. At its best, the church – together 
with other communities and bodies – upholds this freedom from political coercion 
and thereby helps protect the autonomy of Jewish, Muslim and other religious 
minorities.
In turn, this gives rise to the idea that the ‘intermediary institutions’ of civil 
society are more primary than either the centralised national state or the trans-
national ‘anarchic’ market. Intermediary institutions include groups and bodies 
such as professional associations, manufacturing and trading guilds, cooperatives, 
trade unions, voluntary organisations, universities and religious communities. In 
parts of Italy, Germany, France or Spain, they exemplify the concrete reality of 
a mixed economy that combines gift-giving with economic exchange. In Britain, 
there are even grassroots initiatives to apply this approach to public services and 
welfare provision. The idea is to foster civic participation based on self-organi-
sation, social enterprise, reciprocity and mutuality, which help produce a sense 
of shared ownership. This approach seeks to balance liberty and responsibility 
as well as rights and duties. As such, it differs markedly from centralised state 
models that reduce people to needy recipients of public benefits and also from 
free-market models that degrade citizens to passive consumers of private services. 
By contrast, the real ‘third way’ of Catholic social teaching and cognate traditions 
in Anglicanism and Eastern Orthodoxy encourages active, voluntary membership 
of people who give as well as receive. There can also be secular intimations of 
this: mutualist arrangements such as employee-ownership that share both owner-
ship, profit and risk are in the medium and long term economically more viable 
than many ordinary businesses that seek to maximise short-term return for their 
institutional investors and the top management.
The European model is neo-medieval in this sense that it combines a strong 
sense of overlapping jurisdictions and multiple membership with a contemporary 
focus on transnational networks as well as the institutions and actors of ‘global 
civil society’. Nor is this model limited to the sub-national level. Rather, modes of 
association and corporation apply to neighbourhoods, communities, cities, regions 
and states alike. The idea of Europe as a political union is inextricably linked to 
the idea that national states are more like regions within a wider polity – a subsidi-
ary (con)federation of nations rather than a centralised superstate or a glorified 
free-trade area. Indeed, this suggests that even nations can uphold and promote 
relations of mutual giving and reciprocal help. As such, Europe offers a vision of 
associative democracy and civil economy beyond the authoritarian central state 
that seeks to regulate the transnational, anarchical ‘free market’.44 Such a vision 
is inspired by the twin Catholic Christian principles of subsidiarity and solidarity 
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that underpin the entire project of European integration and enlargement and that 
we owe to Europe’s Christian heritage – in particular Catholic social teaching.45
This legacy has been undermined and in large measure destroyed by the collu-
sion of the central state and the free market since the advent of neo-liberalism that 
both the left and the right have enthusiastically embraced. However, twenty years 
after the collapse of state communism, the continuing crisis of ‘free-market’ capi-
talism provides a unique opportunity to chart an alternative path that re-embeds 
the state and the market into the relations of civil society. Thus, the principles and 
practices of reciprocity, mutuality and solidarity do not simply underline Europe’s 
Christian heritage but also offer an alternative future for the European Union and 
the continent as a whole.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show that the standard versions of the secularisation 
and the de-secularisation thesis are obsolete. Neither can explain why the current 
phase of late or (post-)modernity is characterised by more secularisation and at 
the same time by a sustained return to religion. Just as many forms of traditional 
belief and worship are declining, so other forms are progressing (e.g. Catholic 
charismatic movements; the growing role of the laity; various forms of youth 
participation across different faith traditions). This, coupled with a reversion of 
faith to a more ‘normal’ presence in (inter)national politics, gives credence to the 
idea that we have already entered a post-secular age in which secular principles 
are no longer seen as neutral, normative or hegemonic.
However, both the United States and Europe remain wedded to models that 
are ultimately secular. American exceptionalism separates church from state but 
ties religious faith to a vague yet dynamic ‘civil religiosity’ that is closer to post-
Christian Gnostic spirituality than to creedal Christianity. The US settlement also 
equates civil society bonds with commercial exchange whereby different religions 
and denominations compete for souls in the marketplace. By contrast, European 
countries features a variety of different arrangements, but they all enshrine the pri-
macy of secular law over against religious principles. Far from ensuring neutrality 
and tolerance, the secular European state arrogates to itself the right to control 
and legislate about virtually all spheres of life. Thus, the alternative to both the 
statist model prevalent in Europe and the market-based model predominant in 
the United States is to view religion in general, and Christianity in particular, as 
indispensable to the autonomy of civil society and the ‘intermediary institutions’ 
– including groups, associations and corporate bodies such as guilds, universities 
and religious communities.
Yet, at the same time, contemporary Europe remains a vestigially Christian 
polity that is to some extent governed by the catholic–orthodox principles of 
solidarity and subsidiarity. This is true of the European Union, which is neither 
a federal superstate in the making nor a glorified free-trade area but rather a neo-
medieval empire, which pools national sovereignty and views states more like 
regions in a wider federation of overlapping jurisdictions and multiple levels of 
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membership. As such, political Europe is certainly less religious but perhaps more 
Christian than the United States.
Beyond the fundamental differences between the United States and Europe 
that this chapter has suggested, there are two wider, parallel developments that 
both continents seem to share in common. First of all, a growing opposition 
between a militant, atheist secularism and a violent religious fundamentalism 
that are mirror images of each other; second, and perhaps more importantly, an 
increasing bifurcation – within as well as across different religious traditions – of 
traditional, orthodox faiths, on the one hand, and modernising creeds, on the other 
hand. In the United States, we are seeing a significant rapprochement of Catholics 
and evangelicals on economic issues. Likewise, in Europe, where secularisation 
continues to spread, there is also a growing convergence of important strands in 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism around their shared opposition to ‘programmatic 
secularism’ and their social and moral teaching (e.g. in relation to free-market 
capitalism, bioethics or aspects of popular culture). The shape of our post-secular 
age will in large part be determined by the contest between those traditions that 
endorse the secular outlook of late modernity and those that seek to transform it.
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